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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
KAISER ALUMINUM & CHEMICAL SALES, INC.,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
JACK E. LORDS, BETH C. LORDS
and WESTERN STATES -WHOLESALE SUPPLY
Defendants and Appellants.

Case No.
11470

BRIEF 0 F RESPONDENT
1

STATEMEN'l1 OF THE CASE
This is an action by respondent Kaiser Aluminum &
Chemical Sales, Inc. against appellants Jack E. and Beth
C. Lords on their written guaranty for the prompt payment and performance of obligations of Western States
WholPsale Supply.
DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT
A default judgment was entered against the corporate defendant for failure to answer. The case against
the individual defendants was tried to a jury, and judgment wa~ entered against the individual defendants.
1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The individual defendants seek to have the judgment set aside on the ground that the trial court erred
in rejecting an offer of proof of an allPged agreement
to release them from their guaranty.
CO-CNTER-STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants' statement of the facts involved in thi8
appeal (Br. 2-3) does not set forth all of the facts of
record pertinent to the question before this Court and
respondent, therefore, desires to make this countl>r-statement of facts.
This is an appeal from a judgment entered against
Jack E. Lords and Beith C. Lords on July 22, 1968, (R.
59) after a trial by jury. The Lords were sued upon their
individual guaranty given in July 1965 and the question
presented by this appeal is whether the judgment should
be set aside because the Trial Court rejected an offer
of proof of an alleged agreement whereby the respondent, in November 1965, took promissory notes from the
Lords' corporation in satisfaction of their individual
guaranties.
In July 1965 the Lords guarantied in writing to pay
any account incurred with the respondent, Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Sales, Inc., by Western States
·wholesale Supply of which Mr. and Mrs. Lords were
president and vice president, respectively. The guaranty,
Kaiser's standard form (R. 121), reads in full as follows :1
IA copy of the guaranty was Plaintiff's Exhibit 1-P at the trial (R.
121) and is before this Court.
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Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Sales, Inc.
300 Lakeside Drive
Oakland 12, California
Gentlemen:
For and in consideration of your extending
credit to vVestern States Wholesale Supply Co.,
Inc., a Utah corporation (hereinafter called the
Principal), and for and in consideration of future
shipments which you may make to them upon your
standard published terms and conditions, we, the
undt'rsigned, Jack E. and Beth C. Lords, hereby
jointly and severally guarantee prompt and faithful payment and performance by said Principal of
any and all orders it may place with you and which
are accepted by you, all in accordance with the
provisions, terms and conditions appearing on
your Standard Acknowledgement Form used in
acknowledging and accepting said order or orders,
and we hereby consent to any changes, modifications or additions to said acknowledged or accepted orders or any concessions or indulgences thereunder, and we further waive any and all notices
of default, non-performance or demand upon said
Principal or upon us, as well as prior prosecution
by you of rights or remedies against said Principal to enforce payment or performance, it being
agreed that upon default in payment or performance by said Principal, we shall immediately be
liable hereunder without prior demand or notice.
This shall constitute a continuing Guaranty
Agreement which will remain in full force and
effect until we notify you, in writing, of cancellation hereof; provided, however, that any such
cancellation shall not alter or affect any obligations or promises which we have assumed or made
hereunder with respect to any orders for aluminum materials placed by said Principal with you
3

and accepted by you prior to receipt by you of
said notice of cancellation.
In the event of nonpayment of principal or
interest when due, the undersigned hereby agrees
to pay all costs of collection including attorneys
fees.
Dated this 29th day of July, 1965.
/s/ Jack E. Lords
/s/ Beth C. Lords
After merchandise had been shipped by Kaiser to
Western States, and after some of the merchandise had
been returned to Kaiser, for which a credit was given, a
complaint was filed against the Lords asking judgment
for $8,265.97, together with attorney fees of $1,450.00. (R.
1-2.) The complaint alleges that Kaiser had sold goods
and building materials to Western States for the sum of
$8,265.97, that payment had been demanded of Western
States and of Lords pursuant to their guaranty, and that
payment had not been made.
The Lords answered on March 28, 1967, denying generally that they were indebted to Kaiser, and alleging in
particular that any indebtedness of theirs by reason of
the guaranty had been satisfied as follows (R. 4):
1. That on or about the 1st day of October,
1966, the plaintiff, acting through and by its duly
authorized agent and credit manager Kirk McVean, entered into an accord and satisfaction with
the defendants whereby the plaintiff received back
its merchandise which was in the possession of
the defendants and of the Western States Wholesale Supply and West States Construction, in consideration that the plaintiff would fully satisfy
4

any indebtedness or obligation that the plaintiff
might have against the defendants or either of
them, growing out of the instrument sued upon
by the plaintiff or other-wise.
No mention was made of an alleged agreement a year
earlier in N ovembt>r 1965 to rdease the Lords from their
gnaranty when Kaiser took promissory notes from Western States.
After a confrrence with counsel, a Pretrial Order
was filt>d on April 1, 1968, in which the issues to be tried
were set forth as follows (R. 17) :
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The issues to be tried in this case are as follows:
I. vV as there a settlement of the account of
Wes tern States Wholesale Supply in full with the
plaintiff either by an accord and satisfaction or
otherwise.
II. If not, was there an agreement by the
plaintiff upon the return of certain merchandise
to release the defendants from any liability on
their guarantee for any balance owing to the plaintiff by Wes tern States Wholesale Supply.
III. If not, what amount is due and owing to
the plaintiff on the Western States Wholesale
Supply account and are the defendants, or either
of them, liable therefor.
IV. If vVestern States Wholesale Supply is
made a party defendant as hereinafter considered,
what amount, if any, would plaintiff be entitled
to recover against Wes tern States Wholesale Supply.
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Again, no mention was made of an alleged agreement in
November 1965 to release the Lords from their guaranty.
An Amended Complaint (R. 19-22) was later filed
on April 22, 1968, in which a Second Claim for Relief
was added alleging, as against vVestern States, that the
sum of $8,265.97 was due and unpaid on a nofr from
vVestern States dated November 1, 1965. Judµ;rnent wa:-;
asked against the Lords and against Western States for
$8,265.97 and attorney fees of $1,450.00. ( R. 19-21.)
On June 27, 1968, a default judgment 'vas entered
against ·western States in the amounts requested in the
Amended Complaint. (R. 36-37.)
At the trial on July 9, 1968, the Lords' Answer was
accepted as an answer to the Amended Complaint (R.
108), and the Trial Court refused to set aside the default
judgment against Western States (R. 111), and then, for
the first time, after the jury had been impaneled, counsel
for Lords asserted that there had been an agreement
whereby the Lords' guaranty was released when Western
States gave its note to Kaiser on November 1, 1965
(R. 111-112). The issue was discussed at length by the
Trial Court and counsel for both parties, and an offer of
proof was made which the Trial Court refused for failure
to raise the issue at the pretrial conference. (R. 111-118.)
Counsel for Kaiser had no notice that the issue would be
raised, was not prepared to meet the issue at the trial,
and claimed surprise. (R. 114, 115, 117.)
The testimony before the jury was directed primarily to events that transpired in October and November
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l!J()(j when Mr. Lords and Mr. Kirk Mc Vean, district
credit manager for Kaiser since May, 1966 (R. 120), met
in Salt Lake City to discuss Kaiser's account with Western States and the latter's financial difficulties. There
>rns a conflict of testimony over the question whether
Kai1'er had agreed to release the Lords from their per:-;onal gnarant~' in connection with their return of certain
merchandise to Kaiser in November 1966.

McVean Testified (R. 119-132) that he obtained for
Kaiser a financing statement to protect merchandise in
the "Western States warehouse (R. 122) and that he told
Mr. Lords that Kaiser would take the merchandise back
if the then balance of the \Vestern States account, $6,300,
wonld be paid (R.123-124). l\foYean denied that any mention 1rns made during his negotiations with Mr. Lords of
rl'leasing the Lords from their personal guaranty. (R.
132.) 'rhe debt owing to Kaiser was not paid but some
of the merchandise was returned to Kaiser without authorization and Kaiser decided to accept it and to give the
Lords credit for it. (R 124-125.)
Lords testified (R. 133-143) that he was unwilling to
return the merchandise, that he preferred to sell it for
the profit he could expect, and that he agreed finally to
return the merchandise after consulting his attorney, on
the assurance that Kaiser would release the Lords from
their guaranty (R. 138).
At the conclusion of the trial written instructions
were gi,'en to the jury including special interrogatories
requested by counsel for the Lords (R. 176) one of which
reads as follows (R. 48):

7

Proposition No. 1
It was the intention of the parties that Western States Wholesale Supply return the merchandise it had on hand, and that Kaiser Aluminum and
Chemical Sales, Inc. was to receive back said merchandise in full settlement of the account, and relieve Jack E. Lords and Beth C. Lords of their
obligation as guarantors.
(Strike ont one)

True

'

False

If you have answered "True" on Proposition No.
1, then the court will find that the account sued
upon has been paid in full, and that the def endants, Jack E. Lords and Beth C. Lords, are entitled to judgment against the plaintiff, "No cause
for action." In that event, you will not be required
to answer Proposition No. 2.
If you have answered "False" to Proposition
No. 1, the court will find in favor of the plaintiff
and against Jack E. Lords and Beth C. Lords on
their guarantee for the amount of the judgment
obtained against Wes tern States Wholesale Supply, which is in evidence before you. In that event,
you will be required to answer Proposition No. 2.
The jury responded to Provosition No. 1
word "False". (R. 48.)

b~-

striking the

The Lords moved for a new trial on seyeral grounds.
(R. 62.) After a hearing (R. 155) at which the rejected
offer of proof of the 1965 agreement was discussed (R.
171-178), the motion was denied (R.178).
This appeal is limited to the rejection of the offer
of proof of the 1965 agret>ment. (Br. 2, 4.)
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ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY
REJEC'l'ED THE OFFER OF PROOF OF
THE ALLEGED 1965 AGREEMENT
'I'here was no error in the Trial Court's ruling on
the off er of proof of the alleged 1965 agreement either
at the time of trial or in connection with the motion for
new trial. This is so for two reasons. In the first place,
the issue was not properly before the Court, and, secondly, the testimony of appellant Jack Lords contradicts the
offer of proof and shows the proof to be without substance.
I. The alleged agreement was not properly before
the Court: - More than a year after the Answer and the
Prt>trial Order had been filed and after the jury had been
impaneled and Plaintiff was ready to procet>d with its
case on the issues before the Trial Court, counsel for the
Lords raised the issue of an alleged agreement in 1965
to release the Lords from their guaranty upon which
they had been sued. (R.111-112.)

In the Answer and at the pretrial conference the
defense was in alleged accord and satisfaction arising
from a financing statement which Kaiser obtained for
merchandise in the Wes tern States warehouse and the return of the merchandise to Kaiser in October and November 1966. (R. 4, 15-18.) Kaiser was prepared to meet
the issue of accord and satisfaction in 1966 and had sent
its officer, Mr. McYean, who dealt with Mr. Lords in
1966, to testify at the trial. There was no one to testify
for Kaiser in the issue of an alleged agreement in 1965.
9

Kaiser properly claimed surprise and objected to the
offer of proof. (R. 114-118.)
A pretrial order is the Trial Court's statement of
what the parties have admitted or agreed upon and when
the order has been entered it ''controls the subsequent
course of the action" except when adherence to the order
would result jn manifest injustice. Rule lG, U.R.C.P. The
rule provides in pertinent part as follows:
RULE 16
PRE-TRIAL PROCEDURE; FORMULATING
ISSUES
In any action, the court may in its discretion
direct the attorneys for the parties to appear before it for a conference to consider
(1) The simplification of the issues;
(2) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings;

* * * * *

The court shall make an order which recites
the action taken at the conference, the amendments allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements made by the parties as to any of the matters
considered, and which limits the issues for trial
to those not disposed of by admissions or agreements of counsel; and such order when entered
controls the subsequent course of the action, unless modified at the trial to prevent manifest injustice. * * *
The parties to litigation are bound by their agreement, as set forth in the pretrial order, and "may not introdnct~ at the trial issues not among those included in
10

the order." Moore's Federal Practice, 3d ed., vol. 3, Para.
lG.19, and federal ca::-;es there cited. 2 See also the annotation at 22 A.L.R. 2d 599. ·while there are numerous cases
where pretrial orders have been set aside or modified for
good cau::-;e, we are not mvare of a case where a party has
been permitted to raise an issue at the last moment to the
;;nrprise and detriment of the other party who wa::-; withont notice and, consequently, unprepared to try the issue.
We submit that it would have been "manife::-;t injustice"
to Kai::-;er to proceed to try the issue of the alleged 1965
agreement.

II. The testimony of Jack Lords contradicts the
offer of proof and shows the offer to be withoid sub.)ta nee: There is a direct contradiction between the

tt•stimony of Mr. Lords and the offer of proof as to conditions upon which the Lords' guaranty was allegedly released. According to the off er of proof, the guaranty was
relPased in return for notes issued by the Lords' corporation, Western States, in November 1965. (R. 111-112;
Br. 4-5.) But Lords testified (R. 133-143) that he unwillingly agreed to return certain merchandise to Kaiser a
year later in 1966 and only upon the condition that the
guaranty would then be released. Pertinent portions of
Mr. Lords' testimony on direct examination are as follows- (R. 136, 137, 138):

Q.
A.

Did you meet him, [McVean] again, at a subsequent time1
Yes ; he came back into Salt Lake in the first
part of October, which, apparently, was the

2
The federal cases are pertinent since our Rule 16 is patterned after
Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
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7th of October-excuse me; and, at this time
he indicated that Kaiser was interested in
taking the merchandise back. They were not
only interested, they wanted to take the merchandise back; and, at this time, I had just
gotten a release of the attachment to where I
could get the merchandise out; and I told him
that I would ·want to keep his merchandise because I had some sales lined up for it, and
such; and he said, no, that Kaiser wanted the
merchandise; and I told him I didn't want to
return it, and he kept insisting that they did
want the return of merchandise; and I told
him, at this time, that I felt, if the merchandise were returned, that I wanted to be released from the guarantee because of the
amount of money that was involved in the
sale-the retail sale of the merchandise would
more than take care of the obligation against
the Western States Wholesale Supply, which
my wife and I, personally, had guaranteed.
Q.

Did you mention, also, the wife's obligation
on the guarantee'

A.

Well, yes; our name is signed; She is, personally, guaranteed on the guarantee also.

•••••

THE COURT: What did you say; what did
he say~
A.

I told him the only way the merchandise
could be sent back was with the fact I would
be released; that my wife and myself would
be released from this personal guaranteewould be only way that this merchandise
returned. And, at this time, he said it would
be fine, that he had approval and that this
would be all right.

•••••

Q.

Let me show you what has been marked and
accepted here as the Defendant's Exhibit
2-D ;3 will you examine it and see if that is
the document you signed, for him 1
A. Looks like it; I am sure it is, yes.
Q.

What, if anything, was the consideration or
the inducement for your signing this document?

A.

The signing of that document gave the merchandise back and released me, my wife, and
myself from our personal guarantee.

Would you have signed this document if he
had refused to consent to that proposition 1
A. No, sir; I contacted my attorney on the matter, as Mr. McVean said; went to see my attorney, at that time-Mr. Knowlton.

Q.

Q.

At the consideration of that assurance, you
did sign this document T
A. Yes.

•••••

This appeal arises from a suit upon a guaranty, and
Mr. Lords' defense, in his own words, was that the guaranty existed in 1966 and that he agreed to return certain
merchandise to Kaiser only upon the condition that
Kaiser would release the guaranty in 1966. This testimony is in direct conflict with the offer of proof of a 1965
agreement and there can be no substance to the offer
since Mr. Lords, as his testimony reveals, considered himself and his wife to be bound by their guaranty when Mr.
McV ean met them in 1966.
Def. Ex. 2-D is the financing statement obtained by Kaiser (The
1965 notes from Western States to Kaiser were also marked as Def.
Ex. 2-0 (R. 172) but were not received in evidence.)

3
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Although the jury did not belieYe Mr. Lords when
he testified that Kaiser agreed to accept the returned
merchandise in satisfaction of the guaranty, Mr. Lords'
own testimony as to the guaranty existing in 1966 must
stand. In the face of that testimony, the offer of proof
was properly rejeced and the motion for a new trial was
proprely denied.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the judgment of the Trial Court ~was correct and
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
SENIOR & SENIOR
Claron C. Spencer
Attorneys for Respondent
June 9, 1969
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